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Without frames, no messages. The frame is the message—something which (with all due respect to
Marshall McLuhan) we might be said to have learned from Marcel Duchamp.
 
Duchamp’s Fountain—the most influential art object of the twentieth century—is a work that was never
exhibited, being hidden from view at the last minute by the committee of the Society of Independent Artists
at the 1917 show in New York. Having never quite been seen as such, it is also a work that exists only in its
many copies: the ‘original’ went missing long ago, shortly after the closing of the exhibition in which it didn’t
appear.
 
What kind of an art object, let alone one as notorious and therefore, in a sense, as conspicuous as
Duchamp’s Fountain, has never been seen ... except through the media of its reproductions? Even Alfred
Stieglitz’s famous photograph of the work is no more than the first in a long and seemingly never ending line
of copies, each one at some remove from the thing itself without ever being entirely independent of it.
 
So by gesturing here to a kind of return (to a moment that never
actually happened, at least not quite in historical time; a moment that
exists only in its repetitions without origin, repetitions that don’t so
much repeat as invent), we might be said to stake out the kind of
territory in which the new or the revolutionary is necessarily
compromised or constrained in the wake of Duchamp.
 
New, media, philosophy? Well, yes, but only in a certain sense.
 
With Duchamp, thus implicating everything that came before, art
turned into the work of three functions: signature, event, context. What
used to be called the work ‘itself’ could now be seen as more or less
incidental to art as such. Does it matter that Fountain was a urinal …
or that it was that urinal?
 
Being otherwise indistinguishable from countless manufactured
objects of its type, the urinal that Duchamp chose to call Fountain (the one that was only ever an instance in
a series of any number of identical urinals, and therefore always already no more than a urinal) was made
over into art precisely in that act of naming. No doubt the artist could have called it Jet or Spray, or even—
perhaps in a moment of aleatory or hallucinatory preemption—PlayStation 2, and the effect would have
been the same. What mattered is not that it was named Fountain, but that it had a name.
 
Once named, framed off, as it were, from the series of manufactured readymades from which it had been
cut out, the urinal that was Fountain was re-messaged. Instead of saying, Piss in me, it now said, Think
about me: what am I? What’s happening here?
 
This is both an inaugural and a revolutionary event (art stripped back to the work of the frame—the title, the
artist, the gallery) and at the same time a profoundly Kantian (and therefore to some extent a conservative)
gesture, since art, for Kant, is whatever poses the question of ‘itself’: what am I? In this way Fountain was
both an opening and a return: an opening to conceptual art that would return art (albeit not to any historical
time or place) to ‘philosophy’ in the broadest possible sense, or simply to thinking.
 
But since anything might pose the question of itself, henceforth anything might be art. At which point (but
what point, exactly?) the question of what art ‘is’ no longer matters, and ‘art’ gives way to (con)text.
 
Consider, for example, the computers we’re writing this with. Imagine them exhibited in a gallery—a
MacBook Pro opened in the shape of a ‘V’ and suspended by two stainless steel cables above an iMac
positioned on a pedestal:
 




If you buy this concept, you’ve bought our art.
 
After Duchamp, then, which includes everything that came before, anyone could be an artist. We can all do
it ourselves. Punk’s D.I.Y. aesthetic thus precedes it … and several times over, as Darren Tofts points out
in the present issue: after Borges, after Beckett, after Rauschenberg, after Cage, et al….
 
To paraphrase one of Tofts’ citations of Borges, if not also to repeat Duchamp: it is sufficient that a work
—Fountain, The Artwork Stripped Bare Descending a Staircase #7—be possible for it to exist. What is
therefore essential to the work, to what Kant calls the ergon, is in fact this virtuality; the work’s actual or
material being is merely parergonal.
 
In so far as this couches art in philosophical or quasi-philosophical terms, we may say that art doesn’t
‘express’. It invents. But this is also to reposition philosophy outside both the history of philosophy and its
institutionalisation as a discipline. ‘An image of thought called philosophy’, as Deleuze puts it, ‘has been
formed historically and it effectively stops people from thinking’ (Dialogues, 13). This image gives
philosophy the (false) task of reflecting on questions, problems, phenomena; and what we need to do,
according to Deleuze, is to ‘stop allowing philosophers to reflect “on” things. The philosopher creates, he
doesn’t reflect’ (Negotiations, 122).
 
The Deleuzian philosopher (who is not a philosopher) and the Duchampian artist (who is not an artist): each
of them is already more than one. Who is this (who are these) today if not, at least to some significant
degree, each of us sitting at a computer screen manipulating—as Mark Amerika is fond of saying—source
material everywhere?
 
Some of that material which Amerika sources here, in a fragment from an unfinished novel, derives from
Duchamp’s notes towards what would become The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (1923),
better known as The Large Glass. Attempting to describe the work to a roomful of students, the scene’s
main character, a teacher called Walt, is forced to philosophise Deleuze-style: he doesn’t explicate, he
invents. For Walt, Duchamp’s lesson is that there’s no such thing as human history, history understood as a
product of human consciousness. Instead, what we call consciousness, or used to call consciousness, is
our ‘unfiltered readiness potential’ to ‘remixologically inhabit the Source Material Everywhere’.
 
But since what we are given to source is never straightforwardly and certainly not exclusively actual, this
material is also indistinguishably and necessarily im-material (as in the case of Amerika’s collaborative
audio mashup with Chad Mossholder). Where, for instance, is the Internet? What is its time and place?
Where is ‘it’ such that you might point to it as you would to a table or a chair?
 
If a work may be said to exist by virtue only of its possibility, then such questions are scarcely ‘new’ in the
sense of belonging to an epoch defined by the use of new media technologies. As Tony Thwaites could be
taken to argue here, even the often celebrated and just as frequently mourned idea of the ‘post-human’—a
consequence of our increasing reliance on digital prosthetics—harbours a nostalgia for a form of subjectivity
that never was. For Thwaites, sounding one of the lessons of Derrida’s Specters of Marx, ‘being is infused
by revenance’, such that any distinction between real historical subjects over here and imaginary ghosts
over there is rendered problematic. Or as he puts it in a reading of Althusser, ideology (another of those
things to which we cannot point) interpellates us not as good, bad or compliant subjects, but as subjects at
all. Interpellation, what Thwaites calls ‘response-without-decision’, does not result in ‘the captivity of a
subject who before was free’, but rather in ‘the subject itself’ in all its real-historical concreteness and
materiality.
 
Surely, though, if both textuality and subjectivity are always preceded—as a condition of possibility—by
spectrality, virtuality or unfiltered readiness potential, this claim risks a certain generality that would elide the
specificity of our interactions with different media (whether ‘new’ or ‘old’) and of those media themselves.
This is the question raised by Clare Birchall, Peter Woodbridge and Gary Hall in their interrelated pieces in
the present issue, where their essay, ‘How to Do Justice to Media Specificity’, poses as an exergue to, but
not as an explication of, their video, The Post-Secret State, the third installment in their Liquid Theory TV
series. What differences distinguish these forms, then, such that they are not reducible to forms of textuality
in general?
 
If textual specificities were absolute, however, constituting a set of differences resembling the periodic table
of the elements, how could different examples of a medium (an essay, a video, etc.) be understood as other
than repetitions of a general type: the essay in general, the video in general, etc.? ‘Poems aren’t pies’, as
Simon Critchley puts it here in his response to (again, not an explication of) a poem by John Kinsella—they
aren’t something other than themselves, however impossible it would be to say exactly what any poem (let
alone what poetry) ‘is’.
 
All efforts, in other words, to define the specific features or properties of a medium (whether writing in the
standard sense or new media platforms) would risk essentialising or ontologising those specificities, a point
that could be drawn from Derrida’s early (‘pre-digital’) work (see for example Grammatology) despite claims
that Derrida’s insistence on the pervasive logic of supplementarity commits him to a theory of general media
effects. As Chantal Faust shows here, the necessary errancy and erasure that might be associated with
writing in the Derridean sense, and the ghostly non-presence of the one who writes, do persist in online
forms, but without therefore simply reproducing a general system. For Faust, indeed, ‘the new’ has no fixed
ontology: in her case, since she’s been manipulating images using a flatbed scanner for more than a
decade, the ‘new’ medium is drawing in the old-fashioned sense, ‘a certain lack of communication between
my hand and brain’ leading to surprising results.
 
Other surprising results are obtained by Baden Pailthorpe through his use of new technology to translate
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, the data being visualised in a piece called Topos. Working on the
assumption that ‘code is the contemporary lingua franca’, Pailthorpe’s data visualisation is not a
representation of one-to-one correspondence (an idealised translation of the Orwell novel), but of the
necessity of error—here a product of algorithms—in any attempt to translate a text from one language into
another, or from one medium into another. Novels aren’t pies.
 
East and West aren’t pies, either. But in Paul Bowman’s piece on fight choreography in some recent
Hollywood films, he argues that the ‘borders between East and West have become more and more blurred
within and by the aesthetic crossovers facilitated by new media technologies and the globalised discourses
set up within and by them’. In a fashion not dissimilar to Google Translate’s rendering of Nineteen Eighty-
Four, Hollywood’s translation of a certain ‘Oriental’ style of fighting is also an invention. This so-called
Oriental style itself, however, is already a hybrid of several forms of martial art, none of which is culturally
pure or authentic. Referring to what he calls the ‘deracinated ninjas’ of a film such as Batman Begins,
Bowman traces the film’s ‘Oriental’ fighting style to two street fighters from Europe, who developed a martial
art known as the Keysi Fighting Method that was urban and therefore non-traditional in origin while claiming
to be authentic in spirit.
 
Questions concerning authenticity haunt discussions of new media practices and effects: Facebook friends
aren’t real; email correspondence is impersonal; ebooks aren’t tactile; mp3 files lack warmth; digital art is
too conceptual and not fully felt. Such skepticism towards new technologies, however, is far from new itself,
relying as it does on Plato’s condemnation of writing as a poor substitute for speech—writing understood
simply as written-down speech (see Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’).
 
Deracinated communication and expression? But as if there had ever been other forms.
 
Whatever might be ‘new’ about new media, then, could never be absolutely so, which is not to say that new
media don’t have forms, effects, affects and possibilities of their own. It’s precisely for the sake of
experimenting with and speculating on those possibilities that we’ve developed Ctrl-Z—as a journal, an
exhibition space, an events machine and inevitably (we hope) a ‘brand’.
 
Details of our first event, Writing in the Age of New Media, held at the Fremantle Arts Centre in November
2011, are now available from our homepage.
 
In this inaugural issue of the journal, we are pleased to present a wide range of styles and approaches from
both well known and emergent critics, artists and writers. We thank the members of our editorial board for
their support, and we are especially grateful for the thoughtful comments and advice received from
reviewers of submissions to this issue.
 
We encourage readers to join us in manipulating the source material everywhere by contributing to future
issues, in playful, critical, speculative, interactive, performative or other ways.
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